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This paper introduces the negative feelings associated with the perception of being unfairly treated into a 
tournament model and examines the impact of these perceptions on workers’ efforts and their willingness to 
work overtime. The effect of unfair treatment on workers’ behavior is ambiguous in the model in that two 
countervailing effects arise: a negative impulsive effect and a positive strategic effect. The impulsive effect 
implies that workers react to the perception of being unfairly treated by reducing their level of effort. The 
strategic effect implies that workers raise this level in order to improve their career opportunities and thereby 
avoid feeling even more unfairly treated in the future. An empirical test of the model using survey data from a 
Swedish municipal utility shows that the overall effect is negative. This suggests that employers should consider 
the negative impulsive effect of unfair treatment on effort and overtime in designing contracts and determining 
on promotions.  
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Workers’ perceptions of organizational support and the effect of this on their behavior have 
been the focus of numerous studies in the fields of psychology, social psychology, sociology 
and management research. In this literature the employee-employer relationship is often 
characterized as a social exchange relationship (Blau, 1964), whereby workers feel an 
obligation to respond to employers’ commitments such as promotion, a rise in pay or other 
benefits, by engaging in behavior that supports the goals of their common organization. The 
basis for this social exchange relationship is a psychological contract, defined as the 
employee’s beliefs regarding the reciprocal obligations between him or her and the 
organization in question (see e.g. Levinson et al., 1962, or Rousseau, 1989). If the 
psychological contract is violated, negative feelings about unfair treatment on the part of the 
firm will arise, and any workers concerned will reduce their contribution to the organization. 
This may be done in various ways: by reducing their efforts (Rousseau, 1990) and doing less 
overtime, by giving notice (Robinson et al., 1994), or even by quitting (Rosseau, 1989; 
Robinson and Rosseau, 1994). The psychological contract is deemed to have been violated if 
workers’ expectations about promotion or pay are not met by the firm. Negative feelings 
towards the employer also emerge if the worker feels relatively deprived
1 vis-à-vis his co-
workers, in terms of such things as career development, wages or fringe benefits. Feldman 
and Turnley (2004), for example, find that relative deprivation is negatively related to career 
                                                           
1 The term “relative deprivation” was first introduced by Stouffer et al. (1949) in a study of performance and 
motivation in U.S. military personnel with a view to explaining how attitudes toward fairness are formed, and 
how group norms determine performance. Runciman (1966) suggested necessary and sufficient conditions for an 
individual’s sense of relative deprivation: i) seeing that someone else possesses X, ii) wanting X, iii) feeling 
entitled to X, and iv) believing it is feasible to acquire X. 
  2attitudes and to job behavior among adjunct faculty and Sweeny et al. (1990) found that 
workers whose pay fell short of the pay of similar others felt dissatisfaction with their 
incomes. 
Feelings of being unfairly treated by the firm and related worker behavior have been 
considered in the economic literature by Akerlof (1982, 1984) and Akerlof and Yellen (1988, 
1990). They have examined how workers’ perceptions of fair treatment affect their effort 
level. According to Akerlof and Yellen’s (1990) fair wage-effort hypothesis, workers reduce 
their efforts proportionately as their actual wage falls short of what they think would be a fair 
wage, i.e. the wage paid to a chosen reference group.  
This paper introduces negative feelings associated with the perception of being 
unfairly treated into a tournament model. In a three-period model it is shown that these 
negative feelings affect the effort levels of relatively deprived workers. But, unlike the 
findings reported in the fair wage-effort literature, the effect of unfair treatment on effort in 
the tournament model appears ambiguous. In this model two countervailing effects arise: a 
negative impulsive effect and a positive strategic effect. The impulsive effect implies that 
workers reduce their effort level in response to the perception of being unfairly treated. The 
strategic effect implies that workers raise their effort level in order to improve their career 
opportunities in an attempt to avoid feeling even more unfairly treated in the future. 
Stark (1987, 1990) and Kräkel (2000) have considered the effects of relative 
deprivation in career games and tournament models. Assuming that no (negative) feelings 
arise from relative deprivation, Stark argues that individuals are motivated by minimizing 
their relative deprivation, not by maximizing their income as standard tournament theory 
  3suggests. His model shows that the intensity of effort to climb the ladder depends (positively) 
on how much relative deprivation there is to get rid of.  
Starting from Stark’s work, Kräkel (2000) models tournaments with different prize 
structures. In his model effort is a function of relative deprivation. As in Stark’s work, there 
are no negative feelings involved in relative deprivation. Kräkel finds that the equilibrium 
effort choice on the part of workers who experience relative deprivation and attempt to 
minimize its effects, is higher than the equivalent choice of workers who only maximize their 
absolute net income under both prize structures. 
In contrast to Stark and Kräkel, the tournament model presented in this paper shows 
that when one allows negative feelings to arise from situations of relative deprivation, the 
relative deprivation does not automatically induce a higher effort level among relatively 
deprived workers. These negative feelings increase the current marginal effort costs of 
workers, who consequently, make less effort to win the current round of the tournament. The 
presence of this negative impulsive effect which is absent from the tournament literature, 
recalls the fair wage-effort hypothesis. 
These negative feelings also have a positive strategic effect on effort. Since workers 
are competing in a multi-period tournament, the higher the individual worker’s expected 
future effort cost (relative to their current effort cost), the higher the level of effort they are 
prepared to produce today. So, even workers who have missed their first promotion and who 
feel unfairly treated realize that they will feel even worse if they miss the second round of 
promotions as well, and will consequently raise their effort level today in order to win the 
next round. 
  4It is not possible to determine which of these two countervailing effects is the 
dominant one, without knowing more about workers’ effort-cost functions. To this end, 
survey data from a Swedish municipal utility located in the Greater Stockholm area will be 
examined. The data indicates that the negative impulsive effect on the effort level dominates 
over the positive strategic effect. That is, unfairly treated workers adopt a lower level of effort 
than fairly treated workers. This implies that employers should consider the negative 
impulsive effect of unfair treatment on effort and overtime when they design contracts and 
decide on promotions. 
In a recent paper, Kräkel (2005) introduces emotions as anger and pride stemming 
from comparing one’s own performance with the performance of co-workers, into a 
tournament model. He models how the employer should compose teams optimally 
considering the impact of emotions on workers’ effort and employer’s profit. According to the 
model, the optimal team should consist of heterogenous rather than homogenous workers 
when emotions are taken into account. Feelings of envy and compassion are also taken into 
account when modeling a tournament by Grund and Slivka (2005). They find that individuals 
who are inequity averse exert higher efforts than purely selfish individuals for a given prize 
structure. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2 and 
the predictions of the model concerning unfair treatment and effort are derived. In Section 3, 
an empirical analysis of the predictions of the model is performed. Section 4 offers some 
conclusions.  
  52 Modeling the effort decision 
A firm hires 2
n risk-neutral workers of identical ability, where n > 1. The workers are 
employed by the firm for three periods, after which they retire. No one quits and there are no 
lay-offs. During the three periods there are two possibilities for promotion to higher positions 
in the hierarchy, based on the workers’ effort levels. A wage ws is attached to position s, 
where s = 1, 2, 3 and w3 – w2  > w2  – w1. All workers are initially employed in position s = 1 at 





First period  Second period   Third period 
Allocation of 






        
Second-period effort 
decisions are made 
Workers are employed and 
first-period effort decisions  
are made 
Third-period effort 
decisions are made 
Retirement
Figure 1. Timing of events 
 
During the first two periods there are ongoing promotion contests. For the sake of 
simplicity and analytical tractability, homogenous workers (i.e. workers from the same cohort 
in the same position) compete pair-wise. At the beginning of each period a worker decides 
what amount of effort, e, to put in during that period in order to receive promotion at the end 
of it. It is assumed that the firm’s monitoring of a worker’s effort is imperfect. The firm 
observes worker i’s effort level as xi = ei + εi and promotes the worker in each pair that puts in 
the highest amount of observed effort, xi .
  ε is drawn from a normal distribution with zero 
  6mean and variance σ
2 and i.i.d. across workers. Unpromoted workers remain in their current 
positions. 
A worker decides what amount of effort to make in order to win a contest by 
maximizing the expected utility from receiving promotion or staying in the current position. 
Since the firm will promote the worker with the highest level of observed effort in each pair, 
the probability of receiving a promotion, p, increases with the effort made.  
The probability that worker i wins over worker  j is: 
p = prob (xi > xj) = prob (ei – ej > εj – εi) = prob (ei – ej > ξ) = -∞∫
ei-ejg(ξ)dξ = G(ei – ej), where 
ξ ≡ εj – εi, ξ ∼ g(ξ), G(ξ) is the cdf of ξ, E(ξ) = 0 and E(ξ 
2) = 2σ
2 (because εi and εj are i.i.d.).  
The effort level chosen involves an effort cost C(e, h), where e is the effort level and h 
is the time spent in the position, h = 0, 1, 2. It is assumed that a worker feels uncomfortable 
about being at work and not working at all, i.e. C(0, h)  > 0, or working less than his 
perception of a fair day’s work, ẽh. It is further assumed that C'(ẽh, h) = 0 where ẽh > 0 and 
that C'(e, h) < 0 if e < ẽh , C'(e, h)  > 0 if e > ẽh.  
The effort cost also increases with the time spent in a position, h, since by assumption 
workers who are not promoted feel unfairly treated by the firm,
2  
                                                           
2 When a worker does not receive a promotion, he feels deprived relative to his co-workers. As noted in Footnote 
1, Runciman (1966) defined four conditions for an individual’s sense of relative deprivation. Someone is 
relatively deprived if i) he does not have X, ii) he sees that someone else possesses X, iii) he wants X, and iv) 
that he believes it is feasible to acquire X. In our present context X is a promotion (Runciman also uses 
promotions to exemplify relative deprivation), and the worker will feel relatively deprived if he does not receive 
a promotion, if someone else does receive a promotion (remember that one in each pair in the contest receives a 
promotion), if he wants the promotion and if it is feasible to get it. Chapter 3 in the Handbook of Motivation and 
Cognition (Olson and Hafer, 1996) provides a survey of the psychological literature on the relation between 
relative deprivation and the emergence of negative feelings of unfair treatment.  
  7i.e. C(e, 0) < C(e, 1) < C(e, 2). It is further assumed that C'(e, 0) < C'(e, 1) < C'(e, 2). 
The worker’s perception of a fair day’s work is assumed to diminish if he feels unfairly 
treated by the firm, i.e. ẽ0 > ẽ1 > ẽ2.
3
In the third and last period workers do not compete for a promotion. They continue to 
work in their current position until retirement.  
 
2.1 The maximization problem 
All newly employed workers find themselves at the first node in the promotion tree in Figure 
2. They are at the beginning of the first period, where they decide how much effort to put in. 
To make this decision, they evaluate all possible current and future outcomes in all contests. 
 
 
                                                    
p(e) 
(w2 – C(e, 0)) 
(w1 – C(e, 1)) 
(1 – p(e)) 
p(e) 
(1 – p(e)) 
(1 – p(e)) 
p(e) 
(w3 – C(e, 0)) 
 
  (w2 – C(e, 1))  (w1– C(e, 0))   
  (w2  – C(e, 0)) 
 
 
(w1 – C(e, 2))   
 
Figure 2. Promotion tree 
 
                                                           
3 This last assumption is supported in the psychological, social psychological and sociological literature. Since 
the employee-employer relationship is regarded as a social exchange relationship, the fact that the firm gives the 
worker something (in this case a wage) implies that it wants something back from the worker. Balancing the 
equity in the relation, means that a worker gives the firm something back (in this case a fair day’s work) in 
exchange for the wage (Blau, 1964). When psychological employment contracts are violated, i.e. when the firm 
does not give the worker what he thinks it owes him (in this case a promotion in return for his effort), he reduces 
his organizational support (for example what he thinks is a fair day’s work, see e.g. Rosseau, 1989; Rosseau, 
1990).  
  8The newly hired workers choose their effort level in order to maximize their expected 
future utility,  
Maxe   U = [w1 – C(e, 0) +p(e)W1 + (1 – p(e))W2]            [1] 
where     
W1 = max w2 – C(e, 0) +  p(e)W3 +  (1 – p(e))W4   
and   
       W2 = max w1 – C(e, 1) +  p(e)W5 +  (1 – p(e))W6   
where    
W3 = max w3 – C(e, 0) , 
  W4 = max w2 – C(e, 1) , 
  W5 = max w2 – C(e, 0)  and 
  W6 = max w1 – C(e, 2) . 
Workers solve the maximization problem by starting with the third-period effort 
decision and working their way backwards to the first-period decision.  
 
2.1.1 Third period 
In the beginning of the third period workers decide how much effort to put in during their last 
period with the firm. There is no promotion possibility in the end of the period, just the date 
for their retirement. Depending on their career path up to now, workers are in positions 1, 2 or 
3 where position 3 is the highest and position 1 is the lowest on the career ladder. 
The maximization problems and first-order conditions for the workers in different 
positions are as follows. Workers in position 3 have received promotions in all contests. They 
maximize 
  9Maxe   U = w3 – C(e, 0 ) ,          [ 2 ]  
where the first-order condition is     
C'(e, 0) = 0              [ 3 ]  
that is fulfilled for e = ẽ0. The second-order condition is 
  C''(e, 0) > 0 .           [ 4 ]  
 
Workers in position 2 who received a promotion in the second contest but not in the 
first, maximize 
Maxe   U = w2 – C(e, 0 ) ,          [ 5 ]  
where the first-order condition is     
 C'(e, 0 )   =   0           [ 6 ]  
that is fulfilled for e = ẽ0. The second-order condition is 
  C''(e, 0) > 0 .           [ 7 ]  
 
Workers in position 2 who did not receive a promotion in the second contest but did so 
in the first, maximize 
Maxe  U  = w2 – C(e, 1 ) ,          [ 8 ]  
where the first-order condition is     
 C'(e, 1) =  0           [ 9 ]  
that is fulfilled for e = ẽ1. The second-order condition is 
  C''(e, 1) > 0 .           [ 1 0 ]  
 
Workers in position 1 have never received a promotion. They maximize 
  10Maxe  U  = w1 – C(e, 2 ) ,          [ 1 1 ]  
where the first-order condition is     
 C'(e, 2 )   =   0           [ 1 2 ]  
that is fulfilled for e = ẽ2. The second-order condition is       
  C''(e, 2) > 0 .           [ 1 3 ]  
In the third period, wages do not affect the optimal effort level (see [3], [6], [9] and 
[12]). The workers base their effort decision solely on the way they perceive themselves to 
have been treated by the firm. Workers who received a promotion in the latest contest feel 
fairly treated by the firm and put in more effort than workers who did not receive promotions 
in the latest contest. Workers who have never received a promotion during their careers with 
the firm feel most strongly that they have been unfairly treated and they put in the lowest 
amount of effort, while workers who received promotions in the first but not in the second 
contest put in efforts somewhere between these two (i.e. ẽ0 > ẽ1 > ẽ2). The reason why 
workers do not shirk altogether, making absolutely no effort, is that, already noted, they feel 
uncomfortable about being at work and not working at all, i.e. it is assumed that C(0, h) > 0. 
 
2.1.2 Second period 
In the second contest workers who won the first contest compete against each other pair wise 
for position 3, and workers who lost the first contest compete pair wise for position 2. The 
idea behind modeling a multi-period contest is that it makes it possible to examine the 
difference in equilibrium effort level between worker types (i.e. promoted versus unpromoted 
workers), and to examine the change in the optimal effort level for a specific worker type (i.e. 
a promoted or unpromoted worker) over time. In this section the difference in the effort level 
  11between workers is examined. In Section 2.2, the change in the effort level over time for a 
specific worker type is discussed.  
To choose their effort level in the second-period contest, workers who received 
promotions in the first contest maximize their utility function, given the effort decision in the 
third position 
Maxe  U = [w2 – C(e, 0) + p(e)W3 + (1 – p(e))W4].            [14] 
Substituting for W3 and W4  we have 
Maxe   U = [w2 – C(e, 0) + p(e)(w3 – C(ẽ0, 0) + (1 – p(e))(w2 – C(ẽ1, 1)].   [14'] 
The first-order condition is  
g(ei– ej)[w3 – w2 – C(ẽ0, 0) + C(ẽ1, 1)] = C'(e, 0),      [15] 
where   
g(ei – ej) = ∂G(ei – ej)/∂ei = ∂p(e)/∂e.                    [16] 
The second-order conditions is 
gei'(ei– ej)[w3 – w2 – C(ẽ0, 0) + C(ẽ1, 1)]– C''(e, 0) < 0.      [17]   
As in Lazear and Rosen’s (1981) tournament model, the Nash-Cournot assumption 
that each player optimizes against the optimum investment of his opponent has been adopted 
here. Worker i takes ej as given in determining his effort level, while the converse applies to 
worker  j. Equation [15] is worker i’s reaction function. Worker j’s reaction function is 
symmetrical. Symmetry implies that ei = ej and G(0) = ½, i.e. the outcome is random in 
  12equilibrium.
4,5 Ex ante, a worker affects his probability of winning by  the amount of effort he 
puts in. Substituting for ei = ej at the Nash equilibrium, equation [15] can be reduced to 
  g(0)[w3 – w2 – C(ẽ0, 0) + C(ẽ1, 1)] = C'(e, 0)             [15'] 
that is fulfilled for e = e*0 . 
It follows from [15'] that when ε is normally distributed with variance σ
2, then g(0) = 
1/√2σ
2√2Π = 1/2σ√Π and the comparative statics are:
6  
  ∂e / ∂w2 < 0   ∂e / ∂w3 > 0   ∂e/ ∂σ <  0.    [18] 
Workers who did not receive a promotion in the first contest maximize the utility 
function 
Maxe  U = [w1 – C(e, 1)+p(e)W5+ (1 – p(e))W6].        [19] 
Substituting for W5 and W6 we have 
Maxe  U = [w1 – C(e, 1)+p(e)(w2 – C(ẽ0, 0) + (1 – p(e))(w1 – C(ẽ2, 2)].     [19'] 
The first-order condition is 
                                                           
4 In Lazear and Rosen (1981) there is not necessarily a pure strategy solution, since the authors do not specify a 
distribution of g(ei – ej). However, they argue that if σε
2 is sufficiently large, there will be a Nash equilibrium in 
pure strategies, even though ∂
2P/∂ei
2 may be positive. Lazear and Rosen make no assumption regarding the sign 
of ∂
2P/∂ei
2, but they do assume that the S.O.C. is negative and that an equilibrium does exist. In my model, I 
make the assumption that ε is normally distributed. Then g(ei – ej) < 0 and the S.O.C. is negative. 
5 The fact that the outcome is random in equilibrium supports the emergence of a feeling of relative deprivation. 
Crosby (1976) has extended the preconditions given in Runciman (1966) for an individual’s feeling of relative 
deprivation to include a fifth condition. That is, to feel relatively deprived a person must lack any responsibility 
for not having X. In the model presented in this paper, the workers in each pair put in the same amount of effort 
and the promotion decision is random, i.e. the unpromoted worker lacks any responsibility for not being 
promoted.
6 The signs of the comparative statics are not dependent on ε being normally distributed, e.g. if ε instead is 
exponentially distributed the signs of the statistics would remain the same. This is true for all comparative statics 
in this paper. 
  13g(ei– ej)[w2 – w1 – C(ẽ0, 0) + C(ẽ2, 2)] = C'(e, 1)          [20] 
and the second-order condition is 
 gei’(ei– ej)[w2 – w1 – C(ẽ0, 0) + C(ẽ2, 2)] – C''(e, 1) < 0.       [21] 
Assuming a Nash solution and substituting for ei = ej , workers who lost the first 
contest have the following first-order condition 
g(0)[w2 – w1 – C(ẽ0, 0) + C(ẽ2, 2)] = C'(e, 1)        [ 2 0 '] 
that is fulfilled for e = e*1. 
The comparative statics that follow from [20'] are:  
  ∂e / ∂w1 < 0   ∂e / ∂w2 > 0   ∂e/ ∂σ <  0.    [22] 
As in Lazear and Rosen’s (1981) tournament model, the larger the wage spread 
between positions, the higher a worker’s equilibrium effort level in a contest will be (see [18] 
and [22]).  If the wage spread increases, the position a worker already holds becomes 
relatively less valuable, such that a promotion becomes more interesting. 
Both today’s feelings and expected future feelings of unfair treatment affect the effort 
level chosen in the contest (see [15'] and [20']). The impulsive effect of unfair treatment 
implies that workers who feel unfairly treated by the firm today, will find it harder to put in 
effort than workers who feel fairly treated (C(e, h) increases in h), and will consequently 
reduce the effort they put in.
7 However, expected future feelings of unfair treatment also 
affect the optimal effort level. If a worker loses the upcoming contest and remains in his 
present position, he knows that he will feel unfairly treated by the firm. His effort cost in the 
next period will increase compared to his effort cost in the present period. To avoid this, he 
                                                           
7 This negative impulsive effect on effort is similar to the effort reduction in the fair wage-effort hypothesis. 
  14exerts more effort today in order to win the upcoming contest. This is defined as the strategic 
effect of unfair treatment on exerted effort. 
g(0) measures the importance of luck in the monitoring process (see σ in [18] and 
[22]). As the importance of luck increases, that is to say g(0) decreases, the amount of effort 
exerted declines. The intuitive conclusion is that there is no use working hard if the 
probability is slight that the firm actually notices how hard a worker is working. Hence, the 
lower g(0), the lower is the effort level in equilibrium.
8  
Comparing [15'] and [20'] we find, on the one hand, that unpromoted workers tend to 
set themselves a lower effort level than promoted workers, partly because the wage spread 
between positions is smaller (w3 – w2 > w2 – w1) and partly because the impulsive effect of 
unfair treatment reduces the effort made (in other words the current marginal effort cost is 
lower for promoted than unpromoted workers, due to fair treatment (C'(e, 0) < C'(e, 1) for a 
given e)) for unfairly treated workers. On the other hand, there is also the strategic effect of 
unfair treatment. Workers who did not get promotion in the first contest know that if they do 
not win the second promotion contest either, they will feel even more unfairly treated. To 
avoid this they tend to raise their level of effort more than promoted workers do (C(ẽ1, 1) < 
C(ẽ2, 2)). Hence, the model produces two countervailing effects. Which of these is dominant 
depends on the specific form of the effort-cost function and the size of the wage spread, and 
the type of worker that makes the greatest effort level is ambiguous.
9, 10  
                                                           
8 In other settings, an increase in monitoring might have the opposite effect on effort. Arai (1989) for example, 
shows that when workers are uncertain about the minimum level of effort required, an increase in monitoring 
may lead to a decline in average worker effort. 
9 Meyer (1992) presents a model of career profiles. In her model, two risk-averse workers of equal ability 
compete against each other in two contests. The firm’s major promotion decision is made after the second period 
  152.1.3 First period 
We now turn to the workers’ effort decisions in the first period, given the effort decisions in 
the second and the third periods. As noted in Section 2.1, newly hired workers choose their 
effort in order to maximize  
Maxe   U = [w1 – C(e, 0) +p(e)W1+ (1 – p(e))W2]             [1] 
where   
W1 = [w2 – C(e*0, 0) + p(e*0)(w3 – C(ẽ0, 0))+(1 – p(e*0))(w2 – C(ẽ1, 1))]    
and      
W2 = [w1 – C(e*1, 1) + p(e*1)(w2 – C(ẽ0, 0))+(1 – p(e*1))(w1 – C(ẽ2, 2))] 
The first-order condition is 
  g(ei – ej)[W1
 – W2]= C'(e, 0 )         [ 2 3 ]  
and the second-order condition is 
  g’(ei – ej)[W1 – W2] – C''(e, 0) < 0.            [24] 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and an interim evaluation is made after the first. The firm designs jobs such that early success is rewarded by an 
increase in future promotion prospects (to minimize monitoring costs) as well as by higher current wages. 
Despite the different conditions after the first contest, the worker who was rewarded in the first contest and the 
worker who was not, will make the same amount of effort in the second contest. This is a function of the 
monitoring process and of the fact that the effort decision is independent of wages won in the first contest. In 
Kräkel’s model, workers who are relatively deprived work harder than their co-workers do, in order to catch up 
with the others. 
10 If we eliminate feelings of unfair treatment, h, from the model we find, in line with Kräkel (2000), that 
workers in position 2 who experience fair and unfair treatment (h is included in the cost function) achive a higher 
effort level than workers in position 1 or those in position 2 who do not experience fair and unfair treatment (h is 
excluded from the cost function). The effort level of the workers in position 1 who experience fair and unfair 
treatment (h is included in the cost function) compared to the other workers’ effort level, depends on the form of 
the cost function. This is shown in Appendix 1. 
 
  16Assuming a Nash solution and substituting for ei = ej , workers in the first contest have 
the first-order condition 
g(0)[W1
 – W2]= C'(e, 0)                   [23'] 
that is fulfilled for e = e*. ε is normally distributed with variance σ
2, g(0) = 1/2σ√Π and the 
comparative statics that follows from [23'] are:  
  ∂e / ∂W1 < 0   ∂e / ∂W2 > 0    ∂e/ ∂σ < 0.            [25] 
From [23'] we see that the effort level in equilibrium in the first contest depends on the 
expected future income and the importance of luck in the monitoring process, g(σ). If a 
worker receives a promotion, his expected future utility is W1. If a worker does not receive a 
promotion, his expected future utility is W2. The greater the expected future utility from 
receiving a promotion relative to the expected future utility from not receiving a promotion, 
the greater the effort the workers will make in order to get promotion to position 2 (see [21]). 
If the future expected utility from not being promoted in the first contest, W2, increases, 
workers will lower their equilibrium effort level, since the value of their current positions has 
increased.  
 
2.2 Tenure and effort 
According to the model, the effort profiles of all workers decline between the first and last 
period. Without specifying a cost function we cannot examine whether the effort profiles are 
hump-shaped over periods (with an increase in the effort level between the first and the 
second period and a decrease between the second and third) or whether they decline (linearly 
  17or non-linearly) over all periods. But we can state that the effort levels of all types of workers 
are lower in the last period than in the first. This is shown in Appendix 2.  
 
3 Examining the model using firm data 
In the theoretical model, workers choose their effort level as a function of the probability of 
receiving promotion, the wage increase that comes with promotion, uncertainty in the 
monitoring process and effort costs including negative feelings of unfair treatment. Using data 
from a Swedish company the following factors are examined: the relationships between i) the 
wage spread between positions and the effort level, ii) unfair treatment and effort level,  iii) 
effort cost (excluding feelings of unfair treatment) and the effort level, and iv) tenure and the 
effort level.  
According to the model, an increase in the wage spread has a positive effect, unfair 
treatment has an ambiguous effect, and the remaining sources of effort costs and tenure have a 
negative effect on the effort level. The results of this examination are discussed in Section 3.2 
after the data used has been presented in Section 3.1. 
 
3.1 The data 
This paper utilizes an original data set based on a survey of employees in a Swedish 
municipally owned company in the public utility industry. The data was collected in 1998 by 
distributing a questionnaire (see Appendix 3) in the company’s mail system to a randomly 
  18drawn sample of 383 of the total 831 employees. 331 employees filled in the questionnaire. The 
response rate of 86 percent is very high for a mail survey.
11  
In this section descriptive statistics are presented for the whole sample, and gender 
differences are commented up on only if they differ significantly. The descriptive statistics are 
given in Table 1. Fifty-seven percent of the employees in the sample are men. The overall 
average age is 43 and male workers are on average about 3 years older than female workers. 
Seventy-four percent of the workers are married or cohabiting, and 34 percent have children 
under ten living in their households. The average number of children per worker is 0.55. Only 
two men (1 percent) have taken leave for childcare for more than 6 months, compared to 38 
percent of the female workers.
12
                                                           
11 Some information is available on the 52 workers who did not respond. Of the non-respondents, 32 are men and 
20 are women. The mean wage for the non-respondents is SEK 21,150 and for the respondents SEK 21,538. The 
mean wage for non-responding men is SEK 20,943 and SEK 23,280 for responding men. The mean wage is SEK 
21,495 for non-responding women and SEK 19,191 for responding women. The gender wage difference is not 
significant among non-respondents but significant among the workers who did respond. The median wage is 
SEK 17,200 for female non-respondents and SEK 18,100 for male non-respondents.  
The sample includes a group of workers whose department had closed down. The firm had a policy of 
not laying off workers when they reorganized. Instead, the workers were transferred to vacancies in other parts 
of the firm. According to the personnel department, the supernumerary workers have jobs that are less qualified 
on average than those they had before the reorganization. The sample includes 51 workers who are 
supernumerary, i.e. 13 percent of the workers who received the questionnaire. Among the non-respondents 31 
percent are supernumerary workers. The overrepresentation of supernumerary workers among the non-
respondents might be a function of their having had a break in their career paths due to the reorganization and 
therefore feel uncomfortable answering questions about their careers.   
12 At that time parents in Sweden could divide 480 days of parental leave (paid by the social insurance system) 
between them. The only restriction in dividing parental leave was that each parent had to be on leave for at least 
30 days, otherwise the paid parental leave was reduced by these 30 days. 
  19The average length of schooling is 12.7 years. Men have on average one year of 
schooling more than women. Workers have had around 9 years of pre-company work 
experience on average. Male workers have been with the firm for 14 years on average, and 
have been there approximately 2.5 years longer than the female workers. The average 
employee has been working in their current position for 4.3 years. 
Information on the number of promotions a worker has received under this employer 
has been elicited by asking the following question: “How many of the changes in your 
position with the company have been promotions (= a change to what you consider to be more 
qualified work)? (Do not count your first position in the company as a promotion)”.
13  
Workers report that on average they have had 1.61 promotions in the company. Male workers 
have on average had 0.5 more promotions than female workers. 39 percent of the workers 
report that they have never been promoted within the firm.
14  
On promotion possibilities the following question was asked: “Do you think there are 
any promotion opportunities for you within the company, given your current position?” Forty-
five percent of the workers reported that there are promotion opportunities for them in their 
current positions.
15 Note that the workers who do not think they have any promotion 
opportunities within the firm may include workers whose competence is too low to warrant 
                                                           
13 To emphasize clearly the difference between promotions and lateral job changes, I follow Hersch and Viscusi 
(1996), in including the following question on positions: “How many positions other than your current position 
have you held with the company since you began working there?” This helps the respondent to separate job 
changes into lateral changes or promotions.  
14 If workers without any promotions are excluded, then on average workers have been promoted 2.65 times (the 
standard deviation is 1.95). 
15 The respondents could answer “yes”, “no” or “I don’t know”. 25 percent reported no opportunities, while 30 
percent were not sure about it.  
  20promotion, workers in dead-end-jobs, and workers who are already in top positions in the 
firm.  
To the question: “Are you interested in receiving promotion within the company?”, 63 
percent of the workers answered that they had preferences regarding possible promotion, 19 
percent answered “no” and 18 percent answered that they were not sure whether they were 
interested in getting promotion within the company. 
To the question: “Would you work 5 hours overtime per week if you knew this would 
improve your chances of receiving promotion within the company?”, 51 percent of the male 
workers replied that they were willing to put in extra hours to increase their chances of getting 
a promotion, while only 33 percent of the female workers replied that they are willing to do 
so.
16 Of the workers who reported that they were interested in receiving promotion, 70 
percent of the males and 48 percent of the females were willing to work extra hours in order 
to increase the probability of receiving a promotion. 12 percent of the men and 9 percent of 
the women who were not interested in receiving promotion also reported that they were 
willing to work longer hours to receive a promotion. These last two results are not reported in 
Table 1. 
 
                                                           
16 33 percent of the men answered that they were not willing to work 5 hours overtime and 44 percent of the 
women reported that they were not willing to do so. 15 percent of the male workers and 23 percent of the female 
workers were unsure whether they would work extra time to improve their promotion probabilities. In the 
analysis in Section 3.3, workers who explicitly state that they are not willing to work 5 hours overtime to 
improve their promotion probabilities will be regarded as workers who are not prepared to make an effort to win 
promotion. 
  21 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variables All   Men    Women  
Women  42.60 %      
Age  43.07  44.36  ***  41.34  
  10.10  10.15    9.79  
Married/cohabiting  74.32 % 76.84  %  70.92 % 
Workers with children under ten   33.83 % 30.53  %  38.30 % 
Average number of children under ten   0.55  0.48    0.65  
  0.88  0.84    0.92  
More than 6 month absence for child care  16.61 % 1.05  %***  37.58 % 
Years of schooling  12.72  13.16  ***  12.13  
  2.79  2.89    2.55  
Pre-company work experience  9.26  9.16    9.40  
  9.21  9.12    9.36  
Tenure  13.02  14.19  ***  11.44  
  9.66  9.74    9.35  
Years in current position  4.31  4.56    3.98  
  6.09  6.56    5.39  
Previously promoted  60.72 % 61.58  %  59.57 % 
Number of promotions  1.61  1.83  **  1.30  
  1.99  2.22    1.59  
Workers having opportunities within the firm  44.71 % 44.74  %  44.68 % 
Workers with preferences regarding promotion  63.14 % 66.32  %  58.87 % 
Workers willing to work five hours overtime per week to get 
promotion  43.50 % 51.05  %***  33.33 % 
Number of overtime hours worked last week  3.61  4.28  ***  2.70  
  4.90  5.33    4.10  
Working hours  38.54  39.16  ***  37.73  
  3.27  2.08    4.25  
Part-time  8.76 % 1.58  %***  18.44 % 
Wage  21,538  23,280  ***  19,191  
  7,031  7,353    5,818  
Number of observations  331   190   141  
Note: Standard deviations are in italics.  
***/**/* indicate that the difference between means for men and women is statistically significant on the 1/5/10 
percent level respectively. 
 
  22Respondents were asked how many hours they had worked the week before the 
questionnaire was distributed,
17 to which 55 percent of the workers replied that they worked 
some overtime hours in the previous week. The average male worker had put in 4.3 hours 
overtime and the average female worker 2.7 hours. Overtime will be used as a proxy for 
effort in the following analysis.   
 



















Figure 3 shows the distribution of reported overtime hours. Categories of overtime 
hours are presented on the x-axis. Forty-three percent of the male and 48 percent of the female 
workers worked no overtime at all. The difference is not significant. Twenty percent of the 
men and 30 percent of the women worked between 0.5 and 5 hours overtime. This difference 
                                                           
17 The question asked is: “Approximately how many hours did you work last week? (If you were absent, report 
the hours worked during the latest week when you were working)” Overtime hours are defined as the reported 
hours worked the previous week less the number of contracted hours. Whether or not the reported overtime 
hours for the latest week worked can be used as a proxy for overtime worked every week is open to discussion. 
Since I am looking at workers’ overtime decisions at the present moment, no assumption that the hours worked 
the previous week represent standard overtime hours worked is necessary. 
  23is significant. Thirty-seven percent of the male and 22 percent of the female workers (the 
gender difference is significant) worked more than 5 hours overtime during the week before 
the questionnaire was distributed. Nineteen percent of the male and 6 percent of the female 
workers worked 10 hours or more overtime in the week before the questionnaire was 
distributed. The difference is significant. Women’s contracted work hours are on average 
about 38 hours a week, which on average is 1.5 hours shorter than the male working week.
18 
Eighteen percent of the women and 1 percent of the men work part-time.
19
The average monthly wage in the company is SEK 21,538.
20 The average wage for 
male workers is SEK 23,280. The average female worker earns SEK 19,191 a month, which is 
82 percent of the average male wage.  
 
3.2 The empirical model 
According to the theoretical model presented in Section 2, the effort level increases in the 
wage spread between positions and decreases with years of tenure and effort costs. Feelings of 
unfair treatment have an ambiguous effect on effort. To examine the relation between effort 
and the variables discussed above,  
EFFORTi  =β0 + β1WAGE SPREADi + β2YEARS BEFORE RETIREMENTi + β3UNFAIR 
TREATMENTi + β4EFFORT COSTi + εi           [26] 
is estimated by a tobit regression, where EFFORTi is the effort level chosen by a worker. 
Effort can be measured in different ways. One is to measure productivity and to evaluate 
                                                           
18 The question asked is: “How many hours do you work every week according to your contract?” 
19 Part-time is defined as working 35 hours a week or less. 
20 1$ ≈ 7.7 SEK (29
th of June, 2004) 
  24workers’ piece-rates or commission (measuring output). Another is to evaluate time spent at 
work (measuring input). I will use the number of overtime hours that a worker puts in as a 
measure of effort. Whether or not it is realistic to assume that firms promote workers on a 
basis of the number of overtime hours they work, and whether they expect promotion if they 
do work long hours, is open to discussion. Recent research on the relation between overtime 
hours and promotions has highlighted the importance of overtime hours in the promotion 
process.
21 It is therefore assumed here that firms and workers both consider overtime hours to 
                                                           
21 For example, Landers et al. (1996) present and test a model of the determinants of work hours in a law firm in 
which the partners take hours as an indicator when making promotion decisions. The authors also offer an 
empirical investigation of the model using data collected from two law firms. Associates and partners were asked 
to evaluate the importance of different factors that were likely to play a part in the promotion process in their law 
firms. Partners and associates regarded the quality of the work product and the willingness to work long hours 
when required, as the most important factors in the promotion process. Landers et al. also asked partners to 
evaluate hypothetical promotion cases. The results show that a partner’s support for a promotion declines with a 
reduction in hours worked.  
Using U.S. and German data, Bell and Freeman (2001) examine whether the chance of receiving 
promotion depends on the number of hours worked. In the German case they use panel data on working time and 
information on respondents’ predictions as to whether or not they think they have good chances of receiving 
promotion in the near future. They find that German workers are more likely to expect promotion in their current 
job if they have worked long hours in the past. They interpret this result such that German workers expect more 
hours worked to bring them promotion. In the U.S. case they use panel data on working time and information 
about whether workers have actually received promotion over the last two years. They find that in the U.S. the 
impact of past hours worked on the chances of promotion is positive. 
Booth et al. (2003) examine the way paid and unpaid overtime affects the promotion probabilities of 
British workers. They find that the amount of overtime worked has a positive effect on the probability of getting 
promotion, and that there is no difference between paid and unpaid overtime hours in this respect. Francesconi 
(2001) also finds that British workers who work overtime have a higher probability of getting promotion than 
other workers. However, if the workers are sorted into four occupational classes, the estimates reveal that the 
positive correlation between overtime hours and promotion probabilities observed in the sample as a whole is 
due mainly to the behavior of professionals and managers. 
  25be of importance in the promotion process.
22 The tobit model is used since the dependent 
variable is left-censored and that there is a possibility that workers actually prefer to work a 
negative amount of overtime hours. 
One of the assumptions made in the model presented in Section 2 is that the wage 
spread increases in positions. To examine this assumption, wages are arranged in ascending 
order of size and the following relation is plotted in Figure 4: 
xi = median wage – wagei (x-axis) versus yi = wage(N+1-i) – median wage (y-axis),  
where i ∈ [1,331] 
Wages are expressed as the workers’ monthly wages in SEK thousands. This 
represents the monthly contracted wage, i.e. excluding overtime pay.  
In Figure 4 the plotted points lie above the reference line. This indicates that the 
distribution of wages is skewed to the right, i.e., on average, the wage spread between wages 
on the promotion ladder escalates over the wage range. If wages always increased by the same 
amount from one position to another, the points would lie on the reference line, and yi would 
equal xi.  Hence, Figure 4 tells us that the wage spread between slots increases the higher the 
position is in the hierarchy, i.e. the assumption that w3 – w2 > w2 – w1 is supported by the data.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Anger (2005a) studies unpaid hours of overtime and its effect on promotion probabilities, wages and 
lay-off risks in Germany. She finds that male West German workers who put in paid over time hours or overtime 
hours compensated by leisure have a higher probability to receive a promotion than others. 
22 There may of course, also be other explanations as to why workers work overtime, besides a striving for 
promotion. For example, workers may have to work overtime just to get through with their work load or to earn 
extra money. According to the Peter Principle workers are promoted up to their level of incompetence, and 
therefore have to increase their hours worked just to cope with their ordinary workload (see e.g. Lazear, 2004). 
Anger (2005b) finds that workers in East Germany work overtime to reduce the risk of becoming unemployed. 
  26 
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Figure 4. Wage spread between positions 
 
The wage spread is defined as WAGE SPREADi = WAGEi+1 – WAGEi  where i ∈ 
[1,331] and wages are arranged in ascending order.
23 In determining effort, the empirical 
analysis will also be extended by using absolute wage instead of wage spread as an 
explanatory variable. The impact of the absolute wage is expected to have a positive effect on 
the level of effort, since on average - as Figure 4 shows - the higher the position in the 
hierarchy, the larger the wage spread between positions and, according to the model, the 
greater the level of effort.  
Since the model presented in this paper is a tournament model, thus implying that the 
workers are in competition over promotions that will in turn increase their incomes, it is also 
                                                           
23 WAGE321 = 53 000 which is the highest wage in the firm. The worker with this wage is not included in the 
sample. The worker with the highest wage in the sample earns SEK 47  000 per month. Hence, WAGE 
SPREAD331 = 6 000. 
  27of interest to extend the empirical analysis by excluding wage spread (or wage) from the 
regression and including instead the number of promotions, PROMOTIONSi, that a worker 
has been granted in the company. Intuitively it would seem that the more promotions a worker 
has been granted, the higher his wage is and the larger the wage spread between his position 
and the next one will be. It is therefore expected that the relation between effort and 
promotions is positive. 
YEARS BEFORE RETIREMENTi is the number of years left before a worker retires. 
The variable is constructed by subtracting the worker’s age from 65, which in 1998 was the 
mandatory retirement age according to the collective agreement.
24 The model predicts that  
the youngest workers will work harder than the oldest workers, but predictions of the effort 
level of workers aged in the middle age group relative to the youngest and oldest groups are 
ambiguous. 
UNFAIR TREATMENTi is measured by the time spent in the last position. Time is 
reported in incremental 6-month periods and is used to examine the effect of unfair treatment 
on the level of effort. According to the theoretical model, effort costs rise with the time spent 
                                                           
24 However, from the month when individuals turned 61 years old, they could choose to take early retirement but 
at the cost of a life-long reduction in the pension of 0.5 percentage points times the number of months left to 
their 65
th birthday. No information is available on the number of workers who have left the company in question 
with an early old age pension. However, only a small fraction of all Swedes receive early old age pension. In 
1998, when this survey was made, 6.5 percent of the Swedish population between 61 and 64 years old were 
receiving early old age pension benefits (source: Statistics Sweden). It was also possible (and still is) to postpone 
the old age pension until the age of 70. The retirement benefit is then raised by 0.7 percentage points times the 
number of months that have passed between the person’s 65
th birthday and the actual date of retirement. No-one 
in the sample is over 64, i.e. no-one has postponed their date of retirement beyond their 65
th birthday. It is 
therefore reasonable to subtract the age of the worker from 65, to find the number of years left until retirement. 
  28in the current position, due to negative feelings arising from a sense of unfair treatment.
25 But 
the implications of the theoretical model are ambiguous. The impulsive effect implies that 
workers reduce their effort level as a reaction to a perception of being unfairly treated. The 
strategic effect implies that workers raise their level of effort in order to improve their career 
opportunities in an attempt to avoid feeling even more unfairly treated in the future. The 
effect of UNFAIR TREATMENTi on the effort level thus depends on which effect is the 
greatest. 
The model implies that the greater the effort cost (excluding costs of unfair treatment) 
the fewer overtime hours a worker will put in. Since there is no specific variable available 
measuring how great a worker’s effort cost is for working 1, 2, 3, ..., or H hours of overtime, a 
proxy variable defined as EFFORT COSTi has been used. The questionnaire includes a 
question about whether a worker is willing to work five hours overtime per week to increase 
the probability of his getting promotion. This variable is used as a proxy for effort cost on the 
                                                           
25 The suggestion that time spent in the current position imposes negative feelings associated with unfair 
treatment is based on findings reported in the literature on psychological contracts. Rosseau (1990) examines 
new hires and their perception of their obligations to the employer and the employers’ obligations to them. The 
most frequently reported commitments to the employer were “doing one’s best”, working long hours and a 
certain minimum length of stay. The most frequently reported commitments from the employer to the employee 
(according to the employees’ perception) were high pay, promotion and career development. That is, workers 
expect promotion and high pay in exchange for doing their best and working long hours. Two years later, 
Robinson and Rousseau (1994) followed up the new hires from Rousseau’s study in 1990. This allowed for a 
longitudinal analysis of violations of psychological contracts. Robinson and Rousseau found that as many as 28 
percent felt that the employer had failed to produce the “promised” promotions and advancement. Respondents 
gave examples of promises made, for example that on recruitment the employer had said that “there were good 
chances of promotions” or “chances for greater responsibility”. If the respondents had not got promotions or 
more responsibility, they regarded the psychological contract as broken. Broken contracts in turn reduce workers 
contribution to the organization. 
  29assumption that workers with high effort costs are less willing to put in overtime in order to 
get promotions. The dummy variable EFFORT COSTi equals 1 for workers who answer “No” 
to the question above, i.e. whose effort costs are high, and 0 otherwise. 
In completing the questionnaire, some workers may have underestimated the costs of 
staying at work for longer than their contracted hours. Consequently other variables assumed 
to reflect effort cost have also been included. These variables are motivated among other 
sources by Becker’s (1985) model on efficient time allocation within the family between 
home production and market work. According to Becker’s model, married women with 
children have higher labor market costs than other workers. Efficient time allocation implies 
that married women with children specialize in home production while their husbands 
specialize in market work. To measure effort costs, the following dummy variables are 
included: FEMALEi equals 1 if the worker is a woman and 0 otherwise, CHILDRENi equals 1 
if the worker has at least one child under ten living in the household, and MARRIEDi equals 1 
if the worker is married or cohabiting. In order to examine also the effort levels of married or 
cohabiting women with children, an interaction variable FEMALEi*CHILDRENI*MARRIEDi  
is included in the empirical model. 
 
3.3 Results 
According to the theoretical model, firms promote workers on a basis of their efforts. The 
results of the empirical model reported in Table 2, Column 1, show that the level of effort 
increases significantly in the wage spread as implied by the model. A re-estimation of 
  30equation [26], replacing wage spread first by absolute wages and secondly by promotions, 
shows that wage and number of promotions are both positively related to effort.
26  
The theoretical model predicted that the youngest workers achieved a higher level of 
effort than the oldest workers, but the effort level of the workers in between was ambiguous. 
The empirical results only show evidence for a relationship between years left to retirement 
and effort in the model using wage as a proxy for wage spread. If the estimated standard error 
of the regression is minimized when examining the form of the relation between the years left 
before retirement and effort – i.e. whether it is linear, quadratic, square root or log linear – it 
appears that a linear relationship produces the best fit.  
According to the empirical analysis, the longer a worker has been in his current 
position, the less overtime hours he works. In the theoretical model, the effect of unfair 
treatment (i.e. time spent in the current position) is not clear. Workers who give greater 
weight to their feelings of unfair treatment today than to their feelings tomorrow (the 
impulsive effect dominates over the strategic effect), will work less hard today to get a 
promotion in the future. The converse also applies. The data indicates that on average the 
impulsive effect of unfair treatment dominates over the strategic effect: the longer a worker 
remains in a position, the less effort he will put into trying for promotion in the future. 
Different functional forms of the relation between UNFAIR TREATMENTi and EFFORTi 
have been examined. The square root functional form fits the relation best in the first and third 
model and the linear functional form fits the relation best in the second model. The square 
root of UNFAIR TREATMENTi is included in the regressions.  
                                                           
26 If WAGE SPREADi and WAGEi are both included in the tobit regression, then WAGE SPREADi becomes 
insignificant. The same holds for PROMOTIONSi when included together with WAGEi.  
  31Table 2. Effort level 
Dependent Variable: EFFORT (Hours of overtime) 
    [1]  [2]  [3]   
WAGE SPREAD/100   0.342 ***       
   0.001        
WAGE/100     0.041 ***     
     0.006     
NUMBER OF PROMOTIONS       0.491  ** 
      0.222   
YEARS BEFORE RETIREMENT   0.046   0.113 **  0.056   
    0.049  0.475  0.051   
Sq.root of UNFAIR TREATMENT    -1.766 *** -1.002 **  -1.609  *** 
    0.464  0.449  0.484   
EFFORT COST   -2.523 *** -2.543 *** -2.576  *** 
    0.927  0.872  0.958   
WOMAN    -1.145  -0.193  -1.298   
    1.052  1.005  1.068   
CHILDREN    -1.294  -1.811  -1.790   
    1.191  1.115  1.207   
MARRIED    1.254  0.385  1.026   
    1.045  0.988  1.061   
WOMAN*CHILDREN*MARRIED    -1.084  -.0158  -0.916   
    1.769  1.659  1.798   
CONSTANT   3.789   -7.172 *** 3.299   
   1.829   2.478   1.985   
LR chi2(8)    54.13  87.46  47.71   
Estimated standard error of the regression    7.017   6.561   7.129  
Number  of  observations    331  331  331   
Number of left-censored observations at 0    148   148   148  
Note: Standard errors are in italics. 
***/**/* indicate significance at the 1/5/10 percent level respectively. 
 
According to the data, if a worker is not willing to put in extra hours in order to get 
promotion, i.e. his effort cost is high, then he will put in less overtime than other workers do. 
There is no evidence that women put in significantly fewer overtime hours than men. There is 
either no evidence that married or cohabiting workers or workers with at least one child under 
10 work less overtime than other workers do. Married mother status has no significant effect 
on a worker’s level of effort. 
  323.4 Careerists or non-careerists? 
In the preceding section we interpreted the empirical results in terms of the theoretical model 
for unfair treatment. The coefficient for time spent in a worker’s current position was 
interpreted in terms of unfair treatment. Another possible interpretation of the result could be 
that there are two types of worker, careerists and non-careerists, whereby the careerists work 
overtime and get frequent promotion while non-careerists never work overtime and do nor get 
promotion. There is then a negative correlation between overtime hours and time spent in the 
current position: non-careerists stay longer in their current positions and work less overtime 
hours than careerists, not as a function of unfair treatment but as a function of their own 
preferences.  
To examine whether the results are a function of the presence of the careerist- and 
non-careerist situations, equation [26] is re-estimated for the sub-sample of workers who had 
declared their interest in getting promotion. The assumption is that workers who are careerists 
do make such declaration. Hence, non-careerists who have a preference for staying in their 
current position and who do not thus work overtime, are excluded from the sample. The 
results are presented in Table 3.  
An analysis concerned only with careerists yields results similar to the analysis of the 
whole sample in Section 3.3. That is to say, the careerists who have been in their current 
positions for a long time work less overtime than their co-careerists who have been in their 
latest position for less time. This is interpreted as meaning that unpromoted careerists feel 
unfairly treated by the firm when they do not get a promotion. This means in turn that their 
effort costs increase, and it will be harder for them to make efforts to get promotion in the 
future, i.e. they work less overtime. 
  33   Table 3. Effort level and promotion preferences 
Dependent variable: EFFORT (Hours of overtime) 
  [1]  [2]  [3]   
WAGE SPREAD/100  0.270 ***      
  0.097       
WAGE/100   0.037 ***     
   0.007      
NUMBER OF PROMOTIONS     0.408
 * 
     0.242  
YEARS BEFORE RETIREMENT  0.172  0.093  0.021   
  0.060  1.217  0.062   
Sq.root of UNFAIR TREATMENT   -1.930 *** -1.049
a -1.813 *** 
  0.648  0.638  0.672   
EFFORT COST  -3.153 *** -3.382 *** -3.356  *** 
  1.256  1.204  1.279   
WOMAN  -1.748  -0.962  -1.829   
  1.271  1.226  1.294   
CHILDREN  -0.876  -1.618  -1.389   
  1.294  1.227  1.312   
MARRIED  0.916  0.122  0.559   
  1.219  1.165  1.237   
WOMAN*CHILDREN*MARRIED  -1.896  -0.559  -1.699   
  2.038  1.946  2.072   
CONSTANT  5.404  -5.071   5.253   
  2.240  3.089  2.404   
LR chi2(8)  39.41  58.27    34.66   
Estimated standard error of the regression  6.581  6.239  6.686   
Number  of  observations  209  209  209   
Number of left-censored observations at 0  83   83   83  
Note: The standard errors are heteroscedastic. Robust standard errors are in italics. 
***/**/* indicate significance at the 1/5/10 percent level respectively. 
a p-value=0.102 
 
4 Conclusions  
Stark (1987, 1990) and Kräkel (2000) introduce the concept of relative deprivation into 
tournaments in their models. They suggest that workers experiencing relative deprivation in 
relation to a specific reference group will raise their effort level to minimize the wage gap 
between themselves and their co-workers. According to these models, workers do not harbor 
  34any feelings of envy vis-à-vis their colleagues or of unfair treatment on the part of the firm. In 
a series of papers Akerlof (1982, 1984) and Akerlof and Yellen (1988, 1990) discuss the 
importance of including workers’ feelings of fair and unfair treatment when modeling a wage 
scheme.  
This paper has presented a tournament model in which the concept of relative 
deprivation is combined with feelings of unfair treatment. The model suggests that relative 
deprivation does not always lead to an increase in the level of effort. Relative deprivation and 
a sense of unfair treatment generate two counteracting effects on the effort made. Workers 
who feel unfairly treated by the firm work less hard today because their effort cost has 
increased (due to unfair treatment). This effect on the level of effort has been defined here as 
the impulsive effect. But workers also evaluate the effort costs they expect in the future from 
not having worked hard today. They know that they will feel even more unfairly treated in the 
future if they lose the next tournament as well. To avoid this they work harder today. This 
effect has been defined as the strategic effect. Which of the effects is dominant, depends on 
the form of the effort cost function.  
Data from a Swedish municipally owned company has indicated that when workers 
decide how much effort they are prepared to make, they pay more attention to the way they 
feel today about how they have been treated than to their possible future feelings of unfair 
treatment. Thus the impulsive effect is stronger than the strategic. That is, the longer a worker 
has been in his present position, the less effort he makes to get further promotion. Hence, the 
effect of unfair treatment on the level of effort in a tournament setting is similar to the effect 
of unfair wages on effort according to Akerlof and Yellen’s fair-wage hypothesis. 
  35The theoretical model in this paper is a partial equilibrium model in which wages are 
exogenous. An interesting task for future research would be to include the firm side in the 
model and build a “full” equilibrium model allowing for the effects of unfair treatment in 
designing an optimal reward structure. 
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  38Appendix 1 
h is excluded from the effort cost function to eliminate workers feelings from the model (i.e. h 
= 0). Workers in position 2 without h in the effort cost function maximize:  
Maxe   U = [w2 – C(e) + p(e)(w3 – C(ẽ)) + (1 – p(e))(w2 – C(ẽ))].     [A1] 
The first-order condition is 
  g(ei– ej)[w3 – w2] = C'(e)          [A2] 
that is fulfilled for ĕ, and the  second order condition is 
  g ′ei(ei– ej)[w3 – w2] – C''(e)   <   0 .        [A3] 
 
Workers in position 1 without h in the effort cost function maximize: 
Maxe   U = [w1 – C(e) +p(e)(w2 – C(ẽ)) +   (1 – p(e))(w1 – C(ẽ))].     [A4] 
        
The first-order condition is 
  g(ei– ej)[w2 – w1] = C'(e)          [A5] 
that is fulfilled for e. The second-order condition is  
 g ′ei (ei– ej)[w2 – w1] – C''(e)   <   0 .        [A6] 
 
From equations [A2] and [A5] we have that ĕ > e (since w3 – w2 > w2 – w1), i.e. 
workers in position 2 work harder than workers in position 1. 
From equation [15'] in Section 2.1.2 we have that when h is included in the effort cost 
function, workers in position 2 have the following first-order condition: 
  g(ei– ej)[w3 – w2 – C(e, 0) + C(e, 1)] = C'(e, 0)          
that is fulfilled for e0*.  
From equation [20'] we have that when h is included in the effort cost function 
workers in position 1 have the following first-order condition: 
  g(ei– ej)[w2 – w1 – C(e ,0) + C(e, 2)] = C'(e, 1)  
that is fulfilled for e1*. 
   Comparing equations [A2], [A5], [15'] and [20'] we see that the effort level chosen in 
equation [12'] > the effort level chosen in equation [A2] > the effort level chosen in equation 
  39[A5] since – C(e, 0) + C(e, 1) > 0 and w3 – w2 > w2 – w1, i.e. e*1 > ĕ > e. The effort level 
chosen in [20'] compared to the other effort levels depends on the relative size of C'(e, 1) to C' 
(e, 0) and C(e, 2) to C(e, 1). 
 
Appendix 2 
From section 2.1.1 – 2.1.3 we see that workers who have received promotions in both contests 
have the following first-order conditions: 
Period 3: 0 = C'(e, 0)         that  is  fulfilled  for  ẽ0   [A7] 
Period 2: g(0)[w3 – w2 – C(ẽ0, 0) + C(ẽ1, 1)] = C'(e, 0)    that is fulfilled for e*0 [A8] 
Period 1: g(0)[W1 – W2] = C'(e, 0)     that  is  fulfilled  for  e*. [A9] 
 
Since [w3 – w2 – C(e, 0) + C(e, 1)] > 0 and [W1 – W2] > 0 we have that ẽ0 < e*0 and ẽ0 
< e*, i.e. the effort level in the last period is less than the effort level in the other periods. 
Since we do not know if [w3 – w2 – C(ẽ0, 0) + C(ẽ1, 1)] is larger or smaller than [W1 – W2] we 
cannot say whether the shape of the relation between tenure and effort is hump-shaped or 
decreasing over all periods for workers who have received promotions in all contests. 
Workers who received a promotion in the first but not the second contest have the 
following first-order conditions: 
Period 3: 0 = C'(e, 1)        that is fulfilled for ẽ1  [A10] 
Period 2: g(0)[w3 – w2 – C(ẽ0, 0) + C(ẽ1, 1)] = C'(e, 0)  that is fulfilled for e*0 [A11] 
Period 1: g(0)[W1 – W2] = C'(e, 0)     that  is  fulfilled  for  e*. [A12] 
 
Since C'(e, 1) > C'(e, 0), [w3 – w2 – C(ẽ0, 0) + C(ẽ1, 1)] > 0 and [W1 – W2] > 0 we have 
that ẽ1 < e*0 and ẽ1 < e*. Since we do not know whether [w3 – w2 – C(ẽ0, 0) + C(ẽ1, 1)] is 
larger or smaller than [W1 – W2] we cannot say whether the shape of the relation between 
tenure and effort is hump-shaped or decreasing over all periods for workers who have 
received promotions in all contests. 
Workers who did not receive a promotion in the first contest but did so in the second, 
have the following first-order conditions: 
Period 3: 0 = C'(e, 0)         that  is  fulfilled  for  ẽ0 [A13] 
  40Period 2: g(0)[w2 – w1 – C(ẽ0, 0)+ C(ẽ2, 2)] = C'(e, 1)  that is fulfilled for e*1 [A14] 
Period 1: g(0)[ W1 – W2] = C'(e, 0)     that  is  fulfilled  for    e*.[A15] 
 
[W1 – W2] > 0. Hence the optimal effort level in equation [A15] is larger than the 
effort level in [A13], i.e. the optimal effort level is larger in the first than in the third period. 
We know that [w2 – w1 – C(ẽ0, 0)+ C(ẽ2, 2)] > 0. But since the effort needed to fulfill 
C'(e, 1) = 0 is lower than the effort needed to fulfill C'(e, 0) = 0 this does not imply that the 
effort needed to fulfill [w2 – w1 – C(ẽ0, 0)+ C(ẽ2, 2)] > 0 is greater than the effort needed to 
fulfill C'(e, 0) = 0. Hence, we cannot say anything about the relation between [A14] and 
[A13]. Equations [A15] and [A14] do not enable us to say whether the optimal effort level in 
period 1 is higher than in period 2. 
Workers who are in the lowest position in all periods have the following first-order 
conditions: 
Period 3: 0 = C'(e, 2)       that  is  fulfilled  for  ẽ2 [A16] 
Period 2: g(0)[w3 – w2 – C(ẽ0, 0) + C(ẽ2, 2)] = C'(e, 1)  that is fulfilled for e*1 [A17] 
Period 1: g(0)[W1 – W2] = C'(e, 0)     that  is  fulfilled  for    e* [A18] 
 
The optimal effort level needed to fulfill 0 = C'(e, 2) is higher than the optimal effort 
level needed to fulfill 0 = C'(e, 1), which is higher than the optimal effort level needed to 
fulfill 0 = C'(e, 0). Since W1 > W2, we get e* > ẽ2. Since [w3 – w2 – C(ẽ0, 0) + C(ẽ2, 2)] > 0 we 
get e*1 > ẽ2. However, we do not know the size of [w3 – w2 – C(ẽ0, 0) + C(ẽ2, 2)] relative to 
[W1 – W2], and cannot say anything about the relative size of the effort between the first and 
the second periods.  
 





2. Year of birth    19____ 
3. Civil status 
□ Married/cohabiting 
□ Single 
4.  How many children under 10 live in your household? _________   
5. How many years have you spent altogether at school? ___________ 
6. What is the highest level of education you have attained? 
□ Elementary school/Compulsory school 
□ Junior secondary school/Upper secondary school/Folk high school 
□ Some university education (no degree) 
□ University degree 
□ Vocational training 
7. How many years altogether have you spent in gainful employment? _________ 
8. How many years have you spent with this company? _________ 
9. Have you ever been on leave from the company for more than 6 months? 
□ Yes 
□ No    
10. If your answer to question 9 was ”Yes”, please state why, and for approximately how many months. 
More than one alternative can be given. 
□ Studying _______ months 
□ Child care ________ months 
□ Sick leave ________ months 
□ Worked for other employer ________ months 
□ Other ________ months 
11. How many hours do you work every week according to your contract? __________ 
12. Approximately how many hours did you work last week? (If you were absent, report hours worked during 
the last week when you were working.) __________  
13. How large is your pre-tax monthly salary? __________ kronor 
14. How many years have you held your position with the company? __________ years 
  4215. How many positions other than your current position have you held with the company since you began 
working there? __________ 
16. How many of the changes in your position with the company have been a promotion (=a change to what 
you consider to be more qualified work)? (Do not count your first position as a promotion). __________ 




□ Don’t know 
18. Are you interested in receiving promotion within the company? 
□ Yes 
□ No 
□ Don’t know 
19. Would you work 5 hours overtime per week if you knew this would improve your chances of receiving 
promotion within the company? 
□ Yes 
□ No 
□ Don’t know 
20. Have you received any kind of education or training during paid working time in the last 12 months? 
□ Yes 
□ No 
21. If you have received such education or training, how many whole working days did it involve?  
________ 
22. Have you ever moved house to get a better job? 
□ Yes 
□ No 
23. Have you ever moved house because your spouse got a better job? 
□ Yes 
□ No 
24. If your answer to question 23 was “Yes”, did you  
□ get a better job? 
□ get a worse job? 
□ get no job? 
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